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Abstract 
The massive popular protests that disrupted the Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization in November 1999 resulted from broad changes in global social and political 
relations that have accelerated in recent decades.  Moreover, many of the groups involved in this 
protest event had been involved in previous struggles for global economic justice, and these past 
struggles contributed to the transnational identities and strategies that emerged in Seattle.  This 
study examines the political context of the “Battle of Seattle,” identifying the participants and 
activities that characterized the struggle.  It explores the transnational linkages among activists, 
suggesting that a division of labor emerged in Seattle whereby groups with more local and 
national ties took on mobilization roles while groups with more routinized transnational ties 
served the role of providing information and frames for the struggle.  An examination of the 
tactics used in Seattle suggests that, to a large extent, national protest “repertoires” have been 
adapted for use in global political arenas.  However, there is some evidence of innovation in 
traditional protest forms in response to global political integration and technological 
innovations. While the study encompasses only a single protest event, the patterns it identifies 
suggest that globalization and the growing prevalence of transnational protest has had enduring 
impacts on the organization and character of social movements.  
 
 
Globalizing Resistance:  
The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements 
 
 On the evening of November 29 1999 Seattle business and political leaders hosted an 
elaborate welcoming party for delegates attending the World Trade Organization's Third 
Ministerial Conference.  At the same time, thousands of activists rallied at a downtown church in 
preparation for the first large, public confrontation in what became the "Battle of Seattle."2  
Protesters emerging from the overflowing church joined many thousands more who waited, while 
variously dancing, chanting, and conversing, in a cold Seattle downpour to join the march.  
Marchers  donning union jackets or rain ponchos that proclaimed their opposition to the World 
Trade Organization and celebrated the "Protest of the Century" filled several city blocks as they 
proceeded to the city's football stadium, the site of the WTO welcome party and the target of that 
                                                         
2During the weekend prior to the WTO meeting, a number of smaller street protests and other 
events took place, beginning on Friday afternoon with a regularly scheduled "Critical Mass" 
bicycle ride through the streets of downtown Seattle and an evening “teach-in” organized by the 
International Forum on Globalization. 
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evening's protest.  An estimated 14,000 -30,000 marchers3 formed a "human chain" three or 
four people across that was to encircle the stadium and dramatize the crippling effects of the debt 
crisis on the economies of the global South.  The protest deterred more than two thirds of the 
expected 5,000 guests from attending the lavish welcoming event.  Although the human chain’s 
symbolism of the “chains of debt” might have been lost on many delegates, the efforts of 
protesters supporting the international campaign to end third world debt (“Jubilee 2000") helped 
to highlight for some protesters and onlookers the enormous inequities of the global trading 
system as they kicked off a week of street protests and rallies against the global trade regime.4 
  The massive opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) during its Seattle 
meeting of Trade Ministers in late 1999 revealed a broad and diverse base of opposition to the 
expansion over recent decades of the neoliberal policies that have oriented the global economy.  
The "Battle of Seattle” and its predecessor campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) and against “fast track” authorization in the U.S. represented some of the first 
major popular challenges to the neoliberal trajectory of global trade relations. Indeed, these 
campaigns may mark a crucial turning point in the direction of economic globalization by 
demonstrating a capacity for mass, grassroots challenges to international trade agreements that 
threaten popular concerns about human and labor rights and environmental protection.5    
                                                         
3 Police estimates cited in local newspaper reports were 14,000; activists reported the estimate of 
30,000 (Njeh 2000).   
4 This account and other details about the Seattle protest events are drawn from participant 
observation research which included: observation at Seattle marches and rallies, attendance at 
teach-ins, lectures, cultural events, press conferences, and strategy sessions organized by various 
factions of the anti-trade liberalization movement, informal interviews with participants; 
observation of the single pro-trade Seattle rally held by the local Christian Coalition chapter and 
the Chamber of Commerce, and analysis of organizational literature and electronic 
communications in addition to local, national, and some international media coverage. 
5Evidence of the impact of the Seattle protests on at least the discourse of neoliberalism’s 
advocates abounds.  For instance, early in 2000, reports were released by the WTO, World 
Bank, IMF and OECD attempting to bolster the case that more trade is needed in order to 
address the needs of the world’s poor.  A report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(2000) noted the need for advanced security measures at international financial meetings.  And 
the discourse at a meeting of the world’s bankers and economists revealed elite attempts to 
respond to widespread “antipathy toward free market competition” (Stevenson 2000). 
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 Protests at the Third Ministerial meeting of the WTO in Seattle challenge traditional social 
movement theories' accounts of state and social movement relationships as they demonstrate the 
increased salience of global-level politics for a wide range of local and national actors.  We must 
ask how globalization-- or the global integration of economic, political and societal relations 
(both formal and informal) – affects both the ways that people mobilize and act in politics and 
social movements.  First, in terms of mobilization, Seattle raises questions about the prospects 
for and limitations on social movement mobilization across national boundaries as well as across 
class and cultural divides.  Critical analysts seek evidence about whether and how social 
movement actors can transcend local and national identities and interests in order to forge a 
coherent opposition to powerful state and corporate elites (see, e.g., Tarrow 2001; Fox 2000; 
Smith 2000).   
 Second, in terms of collective action, scholars must ask how global processes have 
affected opportunities for social movement actors that have forged their action repertoires through 
primarily nationally-oriented contention.  Global integration has clearly altered traditional, state 
level politics and capacities.  If inter-state relationships and treaties are becoming more 
important, then state decisions and practices are constrained to varying degrees by their 
relationships with other states and economic elites.   How do global agreements alter domestic 
political opportunity structures?  Moreover, how do differences in power and interests among 
states affect opportunities for challengers to exert leverage?  To date, relations between social 
movements and inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations have been largely 
accommodative, but Seattle highlights a more contentious history of relations between popular 
groups and inter-governmental financial institutions.   
 What does this contrast tell us about the nature of the contemporary global political 
system and of the role of social movements within it?  This paper traces the origins and 
mobilizing structures behind the Seattle contention and analyzes the tactics of these protests and 
their relevance to international institutional contexts.  By asking both who and what constituted 
the Battle of Seattle, this analysis seeks to advance understandings of how global integration 
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impacts social movement mobilization and action.  
 
Background: The Seattle Ministerial 
 The original WTO agreement passed in 1994 committed member states to pursue a 
Millennium Round of talks that would progressively expand trade liberalization policies under the 
WTO.  The United States and other Western nations were strong advocates of a continued 
expansion of the WTO regime, and they made extensive efforts to advance these goals in the 
lead-up to the Seattle meeting.6  For many states in the global South, however, the WTO had 
proved to be a disappointment.  Although attracted to the agreement by the promise of greater 
access to Western markets and greater influence on multilateral trade negotiations than they have 
in other global financial institutions,7 Southern governments found  themselves left out of 
important decisions taken in the WTO as key deliberations were held in closed-door, “Green 
Room” meetings organized at the behest of the core states (the United States, Canada, European 
Union, and Japan, referred to as “the Quad”).  Agreements defined in these secret meetings were 
then presented to Southern members who were most vulnerable to pressure from the powerful 
Quad states (Vidal 1999; Zoll 1999).  Southern governments also realized fewer economic 
rewards from expanded trade under the WTO than they had expected.  Their agenda in Seattle 
was therefore to review existing agreements and to make them more equitable rather than to 
support a Millennium Round whose agenda was to expand the WTO regime under rules they saw 
as highly skewed towards Western and corporate interests.8  This division among states was an 
                                                         
6Seeing that there was likely to be difficulty reaching an agreement on a Millennium Round, late 
in the lead-up to the Ministerial Conference President Clinton called upon heads of state to 
attend the meeting and show their support for WTO expansion.  Only Fidel Castro signalled a 
willingness to take him up on the offer. 
7Voting in the WTO provides one vote per country member, but in the IMF and World Bank it is 
weighted according to a government’s financial contribution, and the U.S. enjoys the largest 
voting share (nearly 20%).   
8The WTO rules, for instance, progressively liberalize tariffs and other trade restrictions over a 
set period.  Rules for different categories of goods vary, so that tariffs on primary commodities– 
i.e., those that are exported from the South to the North–  remain high until the end of the WTO 
phase-in period, while those on manufactured goods are reduced more rapidly.  Moreover, most 
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important cause of the ultimate breakdown of talks in Seattle.  In addition to this North-South 
split among WTO member governments, a further challenge remained in divisions between 
European and U.S. interests over food safety and agricultural issues.  In short, going into the 
Third Ministerial, governments faced difficult prospects for staging a successful meeting.  All 
hope of bridging the North-South gap was effectively lost when President Clinton succumbed to 
pressure from protesters and pressed for labor protections within the WTO. 
 The social movement forces allied against the WTO expansion certainly contributed to 
this state of affairs.  European governments felt pressures from constituent groups who had 
mobilized mass opposition to genetically modified foods and to trade rules that limited their 
ability to keep such products out of national food supplies.  Farmers represent a strong 
constituency in many European countries, thereby complicating efforts to cut subsidies and other 
agricultural supports.  Governments in the global South benefitted from analyses of the WTO 
provided by researchers who have served as intellectual leaders of the movement.9  Moreover, 
their ability to present a cohesive challenge to the political dominance of the United States and 
other “Quad” states in the WTO was certainly bolstered by their knowledge that it was Quad 
governments’ own citizens who were protesting the meetings.  A more detailed counterfactual 
analysis would have a hard time making the case that the Seattle Ministerial would have failed as 
miserably as it did without the tens of thousands of protesters surrounding the meeting site. 
 The major slogan of the protests was “no WTO” (or “hell no, WTO” if you were a steel 
worker or Teamster), but there was no clear consensus among protest groups about whether the 
WTO itself should be abolished or reformed.  But it was clear that virtually all protesters in the 
streets of Seattle sought to democratize and incorporate values other than profit-making into 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
of the rules take 1994 tariff and subsidy levels as the starting point, so the Southern countries 
that typically had less extensive sets of tariffs and minimal agricultural subsidies were prevented 
from adding new ones, even as they were forced to compete in a market dominated by countries 
that had relatively high tariffs and subsidies to protect their domestic industries (see Khor 1999). 
9For instance, members of the International Forum on Globalization's board of directors, 
including Laurie Wallach and Martin Khor, among others, reported providing analyses of trade 
issues for government officials. 
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global economic institutions.   
 These goals could not be promoted effectively in national contexts for a number of 
reasons.  First, for citizens of countries with small markets and little economic power, attempting 
to affect their own countries’ policies was useless, since these governments could have little 
impact on the ultimate outcomes of international processes.  Second, in countries like the United 
States (as well as within global economic institutions), economic policies are considered 
technical, not political, decisions and are conducted largely in the U.S. Treasury Department and 
in the Trade Representative’s office by trade bureaucrats.  These offices are not open to 
democratic scrutiny, and often the protection of corporate and trade secrets justifies this lack of 
transparency.  Most citizens know very little about these offices and are quickly deterred by the 
technical language used by Trade and Treasury officials.  Third, the WTO agreement has 
removed key decisions from national policy debates, making the multilateral WTO agreement 
itself a target, since it limits the ability of citizens from all member governments to affect even 
their own local and national policies.  Thus, in order to affect the issues protesters sought to 
address, national political action was insufficient.  Even in the United States, which wields the 
strongest influence in the WTO, citizens cannot simply work within domestic contexts to affect 
changes.  They may seek to influence U.S. policy within the WTO, but they gained leverage and 
greater potential for impact by also engaging multilateral political negotiations and by exploiting 
differences among states. 
 
Movement Origins:  Mobilizing Structures and Collective Identities 
 The varied constituencies making up the resistance in Seattle grew out of a history of 
local, national and transnational popular mobilizations around the world that have opposed 
regional and bilateral trade liberalization agreements, the policies of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, and failures of nation-states to protect human rights and the 
environment. What is novel about recent protests is that they involved substantial numbers of U.S. 
citizens and citizens from other advanced industrialized countries mobilized in contentious 
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opposition to the policies of an international organization.  This mobilization also involved an 
extensive web of transnational associations and movement networks that facilitated cooperation 
and political exchange across national boundaries, and it also built upon streams of activism that 
developed over the 1980s and 1990s. 
 The organizations most prominent in the Seattle protests were also involved in prior 
mobilizations around global trade and multilateral financial policies.  Labor organizations, 
consumer groups (most notably Nader’s Public Citizen) and major environmental organizations in 
North America began paying greater attention to trade liberalization policies during the 
negotiations around the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and subsequent North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (See, e.g., Audley 1997; Aaronson forthcoming; 
Ayres 1998; Shoch 2000; Naím 2000).  But the opposition to neoliberal trade policy in Seattle 
can be traced to even earlier roots.  Perhaps the first stream of resistance began in developing 
countries themselves, where resistance to IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies arose as 
countries of the global South sought to address a mounting problem of international debt (Walton 
and Seddon 1994).  Environmental and human rights campaigners increasingly found themselves 
involved in efforts to curb World Bank lending for projects that threatened peoples and 
ecosystems in the global South (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rich 1994).  
Resistance to global economic policies in the global South drew the attention of Northern peace 
activists in the 1980s, and many of the older activists in Seattle, particularly those mobilized 
around “Jubilee 2000" or affiliated with peace movement organizations like the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom, could trace their opposition to global economic 
policies back to the 1980s mobilizations around third world debt and its relationship to conflict 
and economic justice in Central America and other developing regions (see, e.g., Smith 1994; 
Marullo, Pagnucco and Smith 1996).  Partly as a result of these various struggles, the annual 
World Bank/IMF meetings eventually became sites of protest rallies of various sizes beginning in 
the late 1980s (Scholte 2000; Gerhards and Rucht 1992), and an international “fifty years is 
enough” campaign emerged in the mid-1990s to mobilize against the 1995 “celebration” of the 
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fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference and the founding of the World Bank and 
IMF (Foster 1999:145-153; Cleary 1996: 88-89).  
 Research on social movements has shown that formal social movement organizations 
(SMOs) play important roles in framing movement agendas, cultivating collective identities, and 
mobilizing collective actions.  At the same time, churches, community organizations, friendship 
networks, and professional associations often engage in similar kinds of protest-oriented activities 
(even though these are not the principal purposes of these organizations) while providing 
resources for movements.  The more routine contacts of these “extra-movement” groups with 
broad segments of society promote wider participation and legitimacy for social movements 
(McCarthy 1996;C. Smith 1996).  The anti-WTO protests were comprised of a large number of 
“extra-movement” organizations and informal networks such as churches and professional 
associations whose principal organizational purpose is something other than furthering social 
change goals.  This, however, does not preclude them from being important, if not central, 
participants in social movements.  For instance, many churches and unions have standing 
committees that work on social justice or solidarity issues, thereby bringing at least some segment 
of these organizations into regular contact with social movements.  Many labor unions from 
around the United States provided logistical and financial support that enabled their members to 
participate in an entire week of protest and educational activity.10  Also, as in other movements, 
churches played an important role by disseminating information about the protests and by 
providing meeting spaces, legitimacy, and other resources.  Jubilee 2000 was based largely in 
                                                         
10Labor organizations have typically been considered outside at least the contemporary U.S. 
social movement sector because of their historical association with institutionalized politics and 
their tendency to focus on member services and contract negotiations rather than class struggle.  
In practice, some U.S. labor organizations resemble SMOs in their approach to struggle, most 
notably the longshore worker’s union, which has traditionally emphasized radical confrontation 
and class solidarity (Levi and Olson 2000).  The experience of labor in the Battle of Seattle and 
contemporary debates within the AFL-CIO suggest a possibility that labor issues could take a 
more contentious turn vis-a-vis political institutions.  Social movement scholars may find need 
to re-think their assumptions about relationships between the social movement sector and 
organized labor in the U.S.  
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churches and faith-based social justice organizations, and a substantial number of protesters were 
drawn to Seattle through their association with that campaign.  School groups, in particular those 
organized to oppose sweatshop labor, also helped raise awareness of and generate participation in 
protests.  In addition, organizers of the protest events in Seattle worked consciously to cultivate 
ties with community groups and with an active social movement sector in the Pacific Northwest.11 
 But the Seattle protests also built upon transnational mobilizing structures that shaped the 
organizational leadership, strategies, and tactics that organizers adopted.  For instance, the rapid 
expansion in the numbers of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) during the 
past fifty years provided a growing number of activists with substantive knowledge of the 
political views of groups from different parts of the world, opportunities to gain skills and 
experience in international organizing work, expertise in international law, and familiarity with 
multilateral negotiation processes (Sikkink and Smith, forthcoming).  The growth of TSMOs 
generated opportunities for transnational dialogues on conflictual issues and helped organizers 
combine interests and coordinate policy proposals that account for the needs and interests of 
people in both the global North and South.  By facilitating flows of information across national 
boundaries, organizations with transnational ties cultivate movement identities that transcend 
nationally-defined interests and identities.  In other words, they have helped cultivate 
organizational, movement, and solidary identities with a global emphasis (cf. Gamson 1991).12  
Such negotiation of identities is crucial for sustaining any long-term social movement 
mobilization, and groups seeking to build alliances across national boundaries (e.g., where routine 
                                                         
11The Internet site for one of the main umbrella coalitions, People for Fair Trade (supported and 
initially staffed by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen/ Global Trade Watch) provided tools for 
community organizers and organized neighborhood working groups on the WTO in preparation 
for the Ministerial meeting (www.peopleforfairtrade.org/). 
12According to Gamson (1991), organizational identities result from activists’ association of their 
personal identity with a particular SMO.  Such identification can precede or lead to movement 
and solidary identities.  Movement identities refer to the association of the goals and values of a 
movement with one’s own, and solidary identities involve the inclusion of the individual or 
group in a wider community of fate.  Examples of the latter would include class identities or 
identities such as victims of corporate exploitation. 
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face-to-face contact is rare) in particular must engage in deliberate efforts to define “who we are” 
if they are to sustain activists’ commitment. 
 Transnational SMOs must demonstrate wide geographic representation if they are to be 
effective in multilateral political arenas.  The ability to show that one’s organization engages 
participants from many different countries helps lend credibility to the organization’s agenda 
within multilateral settings, and it is therefore a central criterion used by the United Nations to 
determine whether the group merits official accreditation.  It also provides an organization with 
access to first-hand information on conditions in a variety of countries, facilitating efforts to link 
local examples to global policy debates.  But cultivating such a diverse membership requires that 
these organizations create spaces for transnational dialogues and negotiations about common 
goals and strategies (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997).  While most protesters were from the 
United States and Canada, there was substantial representation from other parts of the world, 
particularly among the speakers at protest rallies and teach-ins.13  Many of the activists from poor 
countries who traveled  to Seattle did so as a consequence of their participation in transnational 
associations.14   
 In the process of building coalitions and negotiating joint strategies, activists learn each 
others’ positions and, where conditions favor it, build relationships and trust that are crucial for 
ongoing cooperation (Rose 2000).  For instance, while Western environmental and labor activists 
might accept a policy of promoting environmental and labor protections through existing WTO 
mechanisms, dialogues with their counterparts in developing countries led to a position opposing 
the extension of WTO authority into other areas.  As a result, the common statement endorsed by 
nearly 1500 citizens' organizations from 89 countries called on governments to adopt "a 
                                                         
13Activists and scholars from the global South were 30-40% of the panelists at the largest protest 
rallies and People’s Assembly 
14 Data on transnational social movement organizations shows a trend towards greater 
participation from countries in the global South (Smith 2000).  Moreover, the Ministerial’s 
location affected the under-representation of Southern activists.  United Nations conferences 
held in the global South drew substantially larger numbers of representatives from Southern 
organizations (Clark et al. 1998; Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez 1998). 
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moratorium on any new issues or further negotiations that expand the scope and power of the 
WTO" and to review existing agreements and address their negative impacts on human and labor 
rights, health, women's rights, and the environment.15  While it is difficult to determine the 
impacts of these kinds of joint statements, the process of preparing the statements and, for many 
groups, the decisions about whether or not to sign on to them, can involve extensive group 
deliberations about shared interests and identities.   
 Table 1 maps the structure of major organizational participants in the anti-WTO actions in 
Seattle.  What we hope to learn here is whether the participants in this event were principally 
national or transnational organizations and whether transnational groups differed from more 
localized ones in the types of roles they played in the mobilization.  Prevalent roles for 
transnational organizations would suggest that globalization processes, like the consolidation of 
the modern nation-state in the 18th century (Tilly 1984), are affecting the ways that people 
associate for political purposes. 
 
Table 1 About Here 
 
While the table is not an exhaustive list of organizations participating in protest events during the 
WTO Ministerial meeting of 1999, it does include the organizations most directly involved in 
organizing protest activities and forums and in mobilizing activists to participate in protest events.  
The table helps reveal an important division of labor between groups with formalized 
transnational ties and those with diffuse ties.  The groups with no ties or with more diffuse 
transnational ties and also more informal and decentralized organizational forms were principally 
involved in mobilizing and education as well as in the coordination of efforts to “shut down” the 
meetings.   
                                                         
15The "Statement from Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium Round or 
a New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations" can be found at:  
www.citizen.org/pctrade/mai/Sign-ons/WTOStatement.htm. 
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 Groups with more routine and formalized transnational connections were also involved in 
education and mobilization, but they tended to play more important roles in framing and 
informing the broad protester critiques of the global trading system, lobbying government 
delegations, and relaying information from official meetings to protest groups that lacked official 
accreditation.  They supported other groups’ mass mobilization efforts by, for instance, 
developing educational materials, speaking at rallies and teach-ins, and bringing in speakers from 
the global South.  In many ways, these groups were the international specialists that had ready 
access to detailed information about WTO processes and regulations, could produce examples of 
the effects of global economic policies in multiple countries, and that frequently had privileged 
access to official documentation and government delegations.  As in national contexts where the 
different foci of locally based groups and those in national capitols create rifts in group identities 
and perceptions, there was some evidence of conflict across this division of labor, but this did not 
appear to seriously detract from protest efforts in Seattle. 
 Groups with no formal transnational ties are principally local chapters of national groups 
and local groups formed around the anti-WTO mobilization.  In addition, United for a Fair 
Economy is a national group focused on critiques of inequalities in the U.S. economy.  These 
groups were important to the mobilization of local activists to participate in Seattle protests, and 
often they worked with or were mobilized because of groups like Direct Action Network, Public 
Citizen, or others with more extensive transnational ties.  Groups with diffuse ties include 
regional organizations whose memberships cross the U.S.-Canada border and or groups with 
other transnational ties that grow out of their organizing efforts.  For instance, the Berkeley based 
Ruckus Society (whose leaders include former Students for a Democratic Society organizers) 
primarily brings together Canadians and Americans for nonviolence training.   The Coalition for 
Campus Organizing works to facilitate progressive organizing on college campuses, and it has 
taken on international work focusing on sweatshops  and educational issues, including those 
raised by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).16  Its international work 
                                                         
16The GATS agreement progressively opens trade in services just as traditional trade agreements 
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has led to cooperation with student organizations in Canada. 
 Organizations listed as having "routine" transnational ties typically are national 
organizations whose main organizational work is at the national level but which have staff 
devoted to international organizing or solidarity-building, have formed standing committees for 
work on international issues (e.g., Sierra Club, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen) or whose operations 
involve routine communication and sustained cooperation with activists from other countries 
(e.g., Global Exchange, USAS).  In practice, the transnational interpersonal and 
inter-organizational contacts these organizations develop can substantially affect their 
organizational agendas and frames.   
 In contrast to these associations, organizations with formal transnational structures 
incorporate transnational cooperation and communication into their operational structures.  
Groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have a federated structure, with national level 
branches that help disseminate information on global campaigns and tailor it to national needs.  
The headquarters of these organizations facilitate research and information exchange and, in the 
some cases (i.e., Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace), conduct global level direct action protests 
as well as lobbying.  The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) represents another 
transnational organizational form that is appropriately labeled as a "cadre organization."  A 
collection of experts on globalization issues from around the world, the IFG has, since its 
founding in 1994, produced educational materials and organized "teach-ins" on the impacts of 
global financial integration.  IFG leaders have been called “paradigm warriors” to reflect their 
role in advancing public debate about corporate globalization and its consequences.  Third World 
Network has a similar structure, though it consists entirely of scholars and experts from the global 
South.  Peoples Global Action (PGA) is a loose coalition of organizations from around the world 
with a web site, but no formal organizational headquarters.  PGA involves a large number of 
groups from India and other parts of the Global South that first came together after Zapatista 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
served to open markets for trade in goods.  Such services range from banking and finance to 
public education, utilities, and health, which were on the agenda for the failed Seattle talks. 
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organizers issued an electronic call for an international meeting of like-minded groups (PGA 
2000).  It has convened several international meetings on globalization since the mid-1990s and 
supported public protests at earlier meetings of the WTO and G-7 countries.  The 50 Years is 
Enough Network is one example of what may be an increasingly common coalition organizational 
form.17  Rather than having national branches, this type of organization allows organizations who 
share the Network's views to join as coalition partners and to participate in joint statements and 
actions.  This maintains the autonomy of local and national groups while allowing them to stay 
informed about global issues and to choose how active they wish to become in global campaigns.  
While more can be said about these organizations, the important point here is that they all 
incorporate formal mechanisms for sustained, routine transnational communication and 
cooperation.18  
 The organizational makeup of extra-movement mobilizing structures that contributed 
substantially to the Seattle protests also demonstrate important transnational linkages.  The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), for instance, held its annual 
conference in Seattle just prior to the WTO gathering, bringing with them labor leaders from over 
100 countries.  International exchanges promoting labor solidarity forced U.S. labor leaders in 
particular to confront the more isolationist and nationalist positions that have characterized large 
U.S. unions in the past.  Given that the religious and class identities they promote transcend 
national boundaries, churches and labor unions often promote transnational exchanges among 
their members (C. Smith 1996).  Such exchange might include missionary work, solidarity work 
to support organizing efforts of affiliated unions or churches, and fact-finding visits aimed at 
cultivating shared identities and mutual support.  Because they help link global identities and 
                                                         
17Smith (1997) found that transnational SMOs formed after 1970 were more likely than those 
formed in earlier decades to take the form of coalitions (organizations of organizations) rather 
than federations (a hierarchical structure of transnational organization with affiliated national 
sections). 
18With the exceptions of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (both formed in 1971) and Third 
World Network (formed in 1984), the transnational SMOs listed here were formed during the 
1990s. 
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interests with people’s routine social activities, to the extent that labor and religious alliances can 
be sustained in this movement to transform the global trade regime, they will be important 
structures for advancing transnational mobilization and dialogue to a more general audience. 
 This overview of the organizational makeup of the Seattle protests demonstrates that 
globalization processes have affected the ways that social movements mobilize and organize.  It 
reveals substantial transnational ties among some of the key organizations behind the protests and 
suggests a division of labor between transnational and national or locally-oriented organizations. 
Transnational ties range from diffuse ones which grow out of shared purposes to more formal 
links institutionalized in transnational organizational structures.  In between, we find a number of 
national movement organizations innovating organizational mechanisms to help them incorporate 
new levels of transnational communication and cooperation into their ongoing movement work.  
Groups with more routinized transnational structures appeared to be more involved in lobbying 
and gathering information on WTO negotiations while more national and local groups helped 
disseminate information and mobilize protesters. While this paper presents only a snapshot of the 
actors in a single transnational protest event, seen in conjunction with prior mobilizations and 
with other evidence on transnational SMOs (Smith 2000), the data support the argument that 
social movements have developed more formalized, integrated, and sustained organizational 
mechanisms for transnational cooperation around global social change goals.  This organizational 
development is reinforced by the political demands of the global policy process as well as by the 
political socialization and globally-oriented identity construction that takes place within this 
movement.  Such socialization helps participants not only develop critical understandings of 
global interdependencies and policy processes, but it also builds relationships and trust across 
boundaries by cultivating shared organizational, movement, and solidary identities. 
 
Global Political Processes and Movement Tactics 
 Changes within the global political order, or global polity, parallel the change processes 
that characterized the much earlier rise of national polities (cf. Tilly 1984).  Specifically, they 
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both involved cooperative and conflictual interactions between states, polity members, and 
challengers.  Global institutions are formally controlled by states, but historical analyses have 
shown that social movement challengers have played influential roles in defining the structures 
and purposes of these institutions through their interventions in domestic and multilateral policy 
processes (Chatfield 1997; Finnemore 1996; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Smith 
1995).  States are nested within an increasingly complex and consequential web of transnational 
relations and institutions which both increase their ability to limit external threats -- such as those 
arising from financial and environmental interdependence -- while at the same time expanding 
their vulnerability to social movement challengers. Vulnerabilities arise as multilateralism creates 
new arenas for challengers to question state agendas, draw international attention to domestic 
practices, and to cultivate alliances with powerful actors outside the domestic political arena, 
including other states.  At the same time, the centralization of political authority at the global 
level raises the costs of effective political challenges.  Contenders seeking to defend or shape 
local policies governed by expanding global political arenas must mobilize resources for a much 
broader arena of political action if they hope to affect local changes that are governed by 
international institutional arrangements.   
 If political authority is in fact moving towards global institutions, then we should expect to 
find the kinds of changes in social movement repertoires that Tilly observed with the rise of 
national polities during the 19th century.  Novel to that period were the formation of 
special-purpose associations and the targeting of more remote, national structures by collective 
actors.  These changes paralleled the rise of national electoral politics: 
The distinctive contribution of the national state was to shift the political advantage to contenders 
who could mount a challenge on a very large scale, and could do so in a way that demonstrated, 
or even used, their ability to intervene seriously in regular national politics.  In particular, as 
electoral politics became a more important way of doing national business, the advantage ran 
increasingly to groups and organizers who threatened to disrupt or control the routine games of 
candidates and parties. (Tilly 1984:311) 
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By the late twentieth century, the growth of international institutions appears to have shifted at 
least some political advantage to contenders operating on a transnational scale who can intervene 
regularly in inter-governmental political processes.  Social movements and corporate actors 
wishing to protect certain interests or to resist infringements on existing rights have found that 
they can only do this by building capacities for monitoring and participating in transnational 
political processes.19 
 Does Seattle provide evidence to support this interpretation?  Table two lists some of the 
major protest activities employed during the anti-WTO protests, categorizing them according to 
their relationship to well-established protest forms.  We would expect protest repertoires to 
overlap substantially during periods of fundamental restructuring of economic and political 
relations, just as "old," pre-national protest forms co-existed during the rise of national protest 
repertoires.  Moreover, because global institutions are based on constitutional forms consistent 
with Western state institutions, I do not expect there to be much evidence for the abandonment of 
protest forms developed within that institutional context.  However, we should expect that 
national protest forms are being adapted to target not just the domestic policies of states but also 
their international policies as well as the policies of international institutions.  
 
Table 2 About Here 
 
Adapting the Repertoire   
 The left hand column of table 2 lists examples of adaptations of older protest forms to 
global political arenas.  Many of these tactical adaptations involve simply the transfer of 
movement target from the nation-state to the international policy arena.  Thus, the age-old 
                                                         
19The advantage of transnational mobilization certainly varies according to issue.  Whereas 
human rights and some environmental activists find natural and necessary connections to 
multilateral processes, other areas, such as the abortion debate, are less directly affected by 
multilateral policies and require more local and national emphases. 
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blockade continued to serve movement purposes by physically preventing international meetings 
from taking place.  And street protests and rallies served --as they have with national protests 
-- to dramatize the worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (see McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, forthcoming) of groups that support a social movement's goals.  These protest forms were 
amplified by an "International Day of Action," called on November 30 to coincide with the 
opening of the WTO conference.  "N30" protests targeted financial centers in numerous cities as 
well as United States embassies on the pre-determined day of mass protest at the Seattle meeting.  
One account reported demonstrations in multiple cities of more than 20 (mostly Western) 
different countries, including Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
India, Pakistan, The Philippines, Spain, and Turkey, (www.n30.org).  Protests in London, France, 
Mexico, and India were among those resulting in property damage and/or other violence.   
 Education and Mobilization.  An important part of the protests in Seattle and elsewhere 
were educational actions, which included speaker panels and other events to educate the public 
about economic globalization and its effects on local policies and democratic institutions.  
"Teach-ins," first used in the anti-Vietnam war protests (Gamson 1991), were employed 
throughout the United States and Canada (and possibly elsewhere) to educate citizens about the 
global policy process and the rules and consequences of the WTO.  They served as important 
low-cost and low-risk opportunities for sympathizers to begin or reinforce their involvement in 
the movement.  In Seattle, many of these teach-ins brought together labor activists with other 
groups, enabling dialogues that were unlikely to happen elsewhere.  As was true of the first 
teach-in, these events were spaces where participants’ commitment and identity with a growing 
movement and with other victims of “corporate-led globalization” was cultivated.  Rather than 
focusing on the national policies of the U.S., the emphasis of speakers at these events was on the 
entire global trade regime and the variety of state policies that shape and are shaped by this 
regime.  While mass media coverage of the anti-WTO resistance focused on the street protests, 
more long-term damage to official trade policies may have been done in the churches, union halls, 
and schools where activists and the public were engaging in global civic education.  
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 Activists furthered their mobilization efforts by encouraging organizing around the Seattle 
event among groups such as students, churches, and other social movement groups, and by 
drawing new sympathizers into existing organizations and networks.  A particular effort was 
made -- primarily by the Direct Action Network -- to develop “affinity groups” that would allow 
coordination among activists while preserving local participation, flexibility and responsiveness, 
and helping provide protection from police repression.  Such affinity groups resembled strategies 
used in earlier U.S. movements and is characteristic of the large anarchist contingent in the Seattle 
protests.  Also assisting efforts to resist police repression were efforts by groups like the Ruckus 
Society and DAN to educate activists about nonviolent action and prepare them for confrontations 
with police.  Training workshops in nonviolence, first aid, and legal observation supplemented 
others promoting skills like puppet-making and banner hanging. 
 Public protests also served to generate awareness of issues and to encourage sympathizers 
to become involved in the movement.  Although protests typically rely upon media coverage to 
help spread their message, they also serve movement-building functions by motivating and 
encouraging movement sympathizers and adherents (see, e.g., Lipsky 1968).  Mass rallies and 
protests create a relatively (in many Western contexts) low-cost means for people with limited 
knowledge of an issue to learn about and begin their involvement in a movement.  Moreover, the 
act of protesting creates and nurtures activist identities by dramatizing conflict and polarizing 
identities in “us versus them” terms.  It can generate new levels of commitment on the part of 
both new and long-term activists (see McAdam 1988; Gamson 1991).  When protesters face 
repression by agents of the state– particularly the extreme physical violence and large numbers of 
arrests used in Seattle – this effect is amplified. 
 Protest also affects the dissemination of information about movement goals to a wider 
public.  The participants in protests affect the ways their own organizations and informal 
networks of family and friends perceive the protests and interpret media frames.  They do so by 
providing alternative sources of information from mainstream media frames or by encouraging 
friends and kin to pay greater attention to the public discourse on the protests than they otherwise 
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would.  In addition, when protesters themselves interact with bystanders near protest settings, 
they can convey different, humanized interpretations of the protest purposes and goals than the 
mass media might. 
 Another strategy for mobilizing new sympathizers into the movement involved the 
adaptation of a previous protest form to promote "MAI free zones."  This tactic grew from the 
successful campaign during 1998 to block a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, a “bill of 
rights for investors” which would have liberalized rules on international investment  (see Barlow 
and Clarke 1998).  Activists argued that governments were seeking to revive the MAI in various 
elements of the WTO negotiations, threatening to restrict the ability of local governments to 
control local economic decisions.  The MAI was thus seen as a fundamental threat to democratic 
decision making at the local level, presenting the possibility of recruiting local public officials to 
the anti-WTO cause.  Drawing from the 1980s tactic of declaring "nuclear free zones," 
movement organizers helped raise questions about how this particular global policy would affect 
local interests, thus helping to educate local legislators and the public about the ways the WTO 
agreement impinged on local authority and democracy.  It also helped the movement win over 
some influential and credible allies to their cause.  The fact that the Seattle city council declared 
the Ministerial site an "MAI-free zone" set an ominous tone for visiting trade delegates who 
faced an agenda full of proposals to advance variations of the MAI within the WTO framework. 
 Symbolic Mobilization.  Seattle protesters also took extensive efforts to mobilize symbols 
and to otherwise frame their messages.  Public Citizen and other well-resourced organizations 
sponsored an NGO press center and organized press conferences for mainstream and alternative 
media representatives.  More provocative groups wrapped copies of Seattle Post Intelligencer 
with a satirical headline page titled The Voice of the People.  Headlines like “Jordan Gives Nike 
the Boot/ Joins Worldwide Boycott,” “Mumia Freed,” and “Monsanto Patents Food Chain” (by 
Dolly Bah) greeted those purchasing papers from newspaper boxes near delegates’ hotels and 
other conference sites.  
 Speakers at teach-ins and other educational events engaged in what might be called 
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"global witnessing" of the effects of global economic policies in various countries.  A tactic that 
emphasized such witnessing were transcontinental “caravans” across the United States and 
Canada that brought representatives of citizens’ organizations from around the world to protest at 
the outlets and headquarters of U.S. corporations and to speak in local communities around North 
America about the ways globalization has affected their countries.20  These events gave human 
faces to global interdependencies and implicated Western industry and consumption practices in 
human suffering around the world.  Some caravan speakers brought word of victories of local 
resistance against corporate globalization.  The accounts from poor people around the world 
provided tangible testimony to counter officials’ claims that the WTO’s principal aim is to help 
poor countries.21  Reversing predominant flows of knowledge and assistance, a number of 
speakers from the global South expressed willingness to share their knowledge and experience in 
order to help their American counterparts understand corporate globalization and how to resist it.  
One panel included both third world activists and legislators from the U.S. and Canada, who 
remarked that the accounts they heard from Southern activists would help them face their 
neoliberal opposition in future legislative battles.22 
 Guerilla theater also played an important role in the Seattle protests.  Greenpeace activists 
                                                         
20 The caravans were organized by groups associated with Peoples’ Global Action, and the U.S. 
caravan suffered minor setbacks when U.S. officials denied visas to several participants. 
21 For instance, despite the ambiguous evidence of trade's affects on poor countries (see UNDP 
1998, 1999), in the wake of the failed Seattle talks, WTO Director General Mike Moore stated: 
"I feel particular disappointment because the postponement of our deliberations means the 
benefits that would have accrued to developing and least-developed countries will now be 
delayed . . . . The longer we delay launching the [WTO expansion] negotiations, the more the 
poorest amongst us lose" (http://www.wto.org/wto/new/ press160.htm).  For further detail on 
the discrepancies between economic data and the claims of trade advocates, see Mark Weisbrot, 
"Globalization for Dummies" Harper 300 (May 2000): 15-19; and Jackie Smith and Timothy 
Patrick Moran, "WTO 101: Myths About the World Trading System" Dissent (April 2000): 
66-70. 
22The panel on November 29, 1999, “Environment and Health Day” featured a “People’s 
Tribunal” on “The Human Face of Trade: Health and The Environment.” The “Tribunal” 
included U.S. representatives George Miller and Maxine Waters and MP Bill Blaikie from 
Canada, in addition to Magda Aelvoet, the Belgian Minister of Consumer Protection. Activists 
from Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, Trinidad, Pakistan, and Ghana addressed the 
“Tribunal.” 
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showered government delegates with bunches of condoms bearing the slogan "practice safe 
trade" from a balcony of one of the official meeting venues.  A group of activists from the 
United States and Canada calling themselves "Art and Revolution" were a main source of 
“puppet-ganda” and street theater on WTO issues.  The Direct Action Network promoted and 
facilitated puppet-making, contributing to the protests’ festive atmosphere while providing 
opportunities for activists to engage a variety of different skills to convey political messages in 
creative, irreverent, and often humorous ways.  Banner hangs, where activists risk arrest by 
scaling buildings and scaffolding to display massive banners, aimed at educating a wider audience 
about the issues at stake in global conferences.  One Seattle banner that survived a few hours 
before police removed it displayed the word "WTO" with an arrow pointing in one direction 
followed by "DEMOCRACY" with an arrow pointing in the opposite direction. 
 Seattle protesters also employed adaptations of symbolic resistance such as the "Boston 
WTeaO Party." Here activists appropriated historical symbols of resistance to colonial rule, 
calling for "no globalization without representation" and dumping into Seattle’s harbor rejected 
products such as shrimp caught with nets that kill endangered sea turtles and steel imported at 
prices below U.S. production costs.  While the WTeaO Party took place, a hero of global 
protesters, José Bové, resisted globalization not by smashing McDonald's restaurants but by 
distributing nearly 500 pounds of embargoed Roquefort cheese amid a chorus of protesters' 
cheers.23 
 Disruption.  Disruption and confrontation was an important emphasis of many protesters 
in Seattle, and certainly these activities left the most lasting impressions on much of the mass 
media audiences watching Seattle’s events.  The main protest web site and mobilizing flyers 
called upon activists to “Shut Down Seattle” during the WTO meeting.  The direct action training 
focused on blocking access to the meeting site in order to prevent an agreement to expand the 
                                                         
23The United States had outlawed the importation of Roquefort cheese and other luxury products 
after the WTO backed its claim that the EU ban on the import of hormone-treated beef violated 
trade laws. 
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agenda of the WTO.  Using “lock down” and “tripod”24 strategies where activists risked serious 
physical harm in order to complicate police efforts to remove them, protesters occupied key 
intersections and forced delegates to stay in their hotels for much of the first meeting day.  
Delegates who were out on the streets after being turned away from the meetings were “lobbied” 
by activists taking the opportunity to present their critiques of the WTO and proposals for its 
expansion.  The use of the decentralized, affinity group strategy complicated police efforts to 
respond to protest actions, contributing to both their diversity and effectiveness (Gillham and 
Marx 2000). 
 The activists’ blockade rather than property damage actually triggered the initial police 
response of indiscriminate use of tear gas by mid-morning on November 30 (Author's observation 
notes; Ackerman 2000:63).    Apparently frustrated by their inability to guarantee delegates’ 
access to the opening ceremony, police took this desperate measure in an effort to clear a path for 
delegates and prevent the cancellation of the opening session.  Anarchist groups, who had 
announced over protest electronic list servers their intentions to target downtown shops, did not 
use violence until after the authorities began the cycle of violent confrontation, which escalated 
into what was essentially a police riot. 
 Other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience abounded throughout the week.  Some of 
this activity was directed at communicating protester messages to delegates.  Some of the first 
arrests were of organizers from Global Exchange who – wearing their NGO access badges that 
allowed them into the opening ceremony – took the podium and the opportunity to address the 
handful of delegates who managed to pass through the barricade about the concerns that brought 
them to Seattle that day.  Outside the hall, delegates from the People’s Tribunal against 
Corporate Crimes were arrested as they crossed police lines to deliver their “indictment” to the 
                                                         
24“Lock-downs” involve the use of chains, bicycle locks, clamps, and PVC pipes to link activists’ 
limbs, making the involuntary removal of any one of the lock-down participants hazardous.  
The tripod involves three tall poles that are arranged in a tripod and secured by three activists.  
One activist climbs the poles and sits on or hangs from the tripod.  To remove the barricade 
without causing injury, authorities must bring in a crane or fire truck.   
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leaders of Western industrialized countries of the G-8.  Many more protesters were moved by 
police crackdowns to engage in disruptive protest against the system that they saw brutalizing 
nonviolent citizens and denying First Amendment rights.  Clogging up jails and hampering 
police booking procedures through “jail solidarity”(refusing to give names until all arrestees were 
guaranteed reduced sentences), protesters adopted some classic forms of civil disobedience 
developed through civil rights and anti-Vietnam war era protests. 
  
Innovative Repertoires 
 While many of the Seattle protesters' tactics reflect adaptations of earlier repertoires, we 
see some evidence of tactics that are innovative, not in the sense of novelty, but rather in that they 
have been developed to target multilateral political processes.  Transnational associations are not 
new, but they are relative newcomers to the protest repertoire, and the last half-century especially 
has seen an explosion in their numbers.  And experiences of activists over the course of 20 th 
century efforts to shape the League of Nations and later the United Nations have led to 
“innovations” in the national protest repertoire.  Moreover, these tactics often rely on new 
technologies-- ironically the same ones that have fueled the global economic expansion the 
protesters resist.   
 Organization/ Mobilization.  One of the most basic innovations is the creation of 
transnational associations.  Other mobilizing innovations include the production and distribution 
of a nongovernmental organizational newspaper that presents counter-hegemonic interpretations 
of official intergovernmental negotiations and highlights the proposals and activities raised by 
challenger groups during the several days of inter-governmental conferences.  Such newspapers 
have become a routine fixture at intergovernmental conferences on contentious issues, and they 
have proved important in pressing governments to take up concerns of challenger groups and in 
providing alternatives to great-power dominated conference frames.  They have been used at 
many inter-governmental conferences, including those on nuclear disarmament, Law of the Sea, 
human rights, and women's and environmental issues (Atwood 1997; Clark, Friedman, and 
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Hochstetler 1998; Levering 1997; Willetts 1996).25  
 Borrowing Official Templates.  Activists in Seattle and other multilateral contexts 
engaged in efforts to structure their collective action around official templates.  Thus, one of the 
main coalitions of organizations in Seattle organized a “Peoples’ Assembly” to parallel official 
deliberations.  In order to incorporate the variety of issues and groups motivating activists, each 
day was devoted to panels centered on a different agenda item such as environment and health, 
women, human rights, labor, and agriculture. 
 Another way that challengers borrow official forms is by getting sympathetic experts or 
even movement activists onto national delegations to international meetings.  Because 
international negotiations often involve very technical aspects of science and policy, governments 
must look beyond their traditional diplomatic corps to fill their delegations.  In some fields, such 
as human rights, environment, and women’s issues, some of the most widely respected experts are 
social movement activists.  Their expertise on the issues at stake as well as their familiarity with 
the international negotiation process makes transnational activists a rich resource for governments 
seeking to influence negotiations.  While they are obviously not likely to appear on delegations 
of countries opposing the changes they seek, activist experts may be invited to sit on delegations 
of countries that are sympathetic with their change goals.  Or they may force their way onto a 
delegation by using national laws such as the U.S. Federal Advisory Council Act that requires 
government advisory panels at international meetings to represent a fair balance of viewpoints.26  
When movement activists or sympathizers find their way onto delegations, they often serve as 
important conduits of information between official and popular forums.  
                                                         
25Many of these cases show that government delegates from some (especially poor or less 
central) states have come to rely on movement publications, particularly the newspaper, for 
information on technical aspects of the problems under negotiation and/or the political processes 
surrounding the negotiations.   
26Environmentalists had to sue the U.S. Trade Representative's office in order to have this law 
respected and their viewpoints reflected in the makeup of trade advisory panels on paper and 
wood (World Trade Observer November 18, 1999, p. 1; also available at 
www.worldtradeobserver.org).  As a result of the decision, Friends of the Earth-U.S. president 
Brent Blackwelder joined the U.S. delegation as a Trade Advisory Council member. 
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 Another form of official template-borrowing involves dramaturgy in the application of 
international legal principles and routines.  In Seattle, a "Global People's Tribunal on Corporate 
Crimes Against Humanity" was organized by the Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy 
and the National Lawyers Guild Committee.  Its purpose was to assemble and present research 
on corporate practices around the world.  "Witnesses" included a former sweatshop worker from 
the Philippines who had worked for a Gap subcontractor until she was fired for promoting union 
activities, a farmers’ organization representative from India discussing the effects of Monsanto's 
seed marketing practices on Indian farmers, and an Indian medical doctor who treated victims of 
Union Carbide's 1984 chemical disaster in Bhopal.  The lawyer-activists facilitating the event 
educated the audience and "jury" on the relevant international law and tribunal procedures, and 
the Tribunal issued an "indictment" for crimes against humanity of the governments under whose 
laws the guilty corporations were established.27  The appeal to international law against state and 
corporate practices serves to emphasize the legitimacy or worthiness of the protesters’ cause even 
in the authorities’ own terms. 
 Electronic Activism.  Perhaps the most significant innovations in protest forms result 
from the same technological innovations that have advanced economic globalization, namely, 
electronic communications and exchange.  These were likely introduced simultaneously to both 
national and transnational protest repertoires as technologies facilitating inexpensive transnational 
communications became widely available.  Both national and transnational social movement 
groups have made extensive use of Internet sites and electronic list serves to expand 
communication with dispersed constituencies and audiences.  These communication networks 
allowed organizers to almost instantaneously transmit alternative media accounts and images of 
protests to contrast those of  mainstream, corporate-owned media outlets.  These alternative 
electronic media networks also helped to rapidly disseminate information about resistance against 
                                                         
27 People’s Tribunals were also used during protests against the Vietnam war, and during United 
Nations conferences. Their appeals to international human rights law and direct allusions to 
international legal proceedings following WWII make them tactical innovations. 
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economic globalization in the global South, such as the Mexican student strikers, whose conflict 
escalated shortly after the Seattle protests as strikers rallied in solidarity with the jailed  Seattle 
protesters.  They also undermined authorities’ legitimacy by facilitating the transmission of 
police radio communications during the crackdown on protests. 
 Rather than rely solely on the mainstream media to convey the images of the protests to 
the general public, activists organized an “Independent Media Center” (IMC) in Seattle, issuing 
press badges to volunteer photographers, video recorders, and reporters (no formal credentials 
necessary) wanting to cover the protests.  IMC volunteers had access to a press office and could 
post their reports, pictures and video (some for direct cable broadcast) onto a web site linked to 
other movement sites. 
 Electronic civil disobedience also becomes possible as commerce and other essential 
activities are linked to the flow of electronic information.  Anti-WTO protesters who could not 
get to Seattle could satisfy their desire to join in the protests by engaging in electronic "sit-ins" at 
the WTO Internet site to block other information-seekers' access to the site.  In addition, at least 
one hacker developed a "mirror" site that drew in unwitting information seekers who thought 
they were viewing the official WTO web page, providing them with a subtly different site that 
highlighted criticisms of the organization (Seattle Post Intelligencer, November 29, 1999, p. A1).  
More confrontational “e-protest” takes the form of e-mail and fax-jamming, where large faxes 
(e.g., protest letters written one word per page) and e-mail messages are sent to disrupt routine 
flows of information to targets. 
 Reviewing the tactics employed in Seattle, we find a protest repertoire that both adapts 
forms that have been typical of national social movement repertoires and expands the repertoire to 
address multilateral institutional arenas.  This protest repertoire can be attributed to the 
global-level reorganization of political and economic relations in which challengers themselves 
play a role.  I have argued that the events in Seattle should be examined as part of a more 
continuous process of evolving forms of contentious politics that began late in the 19 th century, 
but gathered momentum especially during the latter half of the 20th century, through which 
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challengers have increasingly sought to influence international policy and processes (see, e.g., 
Chatfield 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  The Battle of Seattle, then, was not the first, nor is it 
likely the last in the contest to shape the course of global economic, political, and societal 
integration.  It is rather part of an interactive process of contention between elites and popular 
challengers that is likely to have implications for the course of future conflicts. 
 
Conclusions 
 This examination of the Battle of Seattle revealed that protests around global trade 
liberalization involve extensive transnational mobilizing structures that are likely to (and, indeed, 
already appear to have) develop further as a consequence of the Seattle mobilization and its 
impact on collective identity formation.  It also showed evidence that tactical repertoires have 
been altered in specific ways, indicating growing experience with attempts to target actors other 
than nation states.  While states are often the ultimate target of policy changes, challengers face a 
more complex system of “multi-level governance” (Marks and McAdam 1996) or “complex 
multilateralism” (O’Brien et al. 2000) whereby the relations among states become important 
resources or obstacles to challengers’ attempts to impact a given state.  For instance, in the WTO 
arena, United States economic policy depends upon support from its European allies.  The unity 
of Western positions was challenged by mobilizations against trade in genetically altered foods, 
making U.S. insistence on unlimited trade a threat to its alliance with other Western states.  This 
case also dramatizes how intergovernmental institutions themselves provide targets for 
mobilization of people in different national settings around common policy goals. 
 When considering the impact of globalization on popular protest, however, the crucial 
question is not whether globalization diminishes the power of states or the importance of national 
political processes, but rather how international institutions affect abilities of both states and other 
elites as well as challengers to influence global political processes.  Indeed, many international 
campaigns ultimately seek to change international policy by shaping the decisions of individual 
states, and therefore they urge participants to target their own (or sometimes other states’) 
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domestic policy processes.  An important component of the success at Seattle were the rifts 
between the U.S. and European states over agricultural and safety issues and between rich and 
poor countries over the rules under which trade liberalization is to proceed.  So while states 
indeed do control international institutions, they cannot control all aspects of the day-to-day 
operations of international organizations.  Moreover, they do not stand together as a united front 
against all challengers.  Some states may serve as movement allies on particular issues, or they 
may see their strategic interests served by movement opposition to other governments’ policies.  
Global activists sought to exploit these divisions among states in their efforts to prevent any 
agreement at the Seattle Ministerial meeting. 
 There are other important questions about the impacts of globalization for protest.  The 
repression faced by protesters should raise serious warning flags for scholars of social movements 
about the ways that globalization affects the practice of democracy (see, e.g., Markoff 1999).  In 
one of the countries with the most staunchly defended right to free speech and assembly, 
government officials were able to successfully enforce an illegal "no-protest zone."  Moreover, 
agents in support of the neoliberal trade regime revealed a blatant disdain for democracy.  For 
instance, Slade Gorton, the Republican U.S. Senator from Washington State appeared on the local 
television news on the night of the N30 protests and vandalism, arguing that Mayor Schell should 
have declared the entire city a "no protest zone."  This comment produced no immediate 
discussion despite its obvious disregard for the democratic process.  Further contempt for 
democratic principles is apparent in a document from a pro-trade think tank, the Institute for 
International Economics, which suggests that a strategy for advancing U.S. trade interests should 
include efforts to eliminate public participation and democratic accountability by, for instance, 
obfuscating the terms used to refer to "fast track" executive authority.  Such authority essentially 
eliminates a meaningful Congressional role in trade negotiations by forcing the legislative branch 
to either reject or approve the whole of agreements (Institute for International Economics 1999).28  
                                                         
28Clinton's earlier efforts to obtain "fast track" negotiating authority were defeated twice 
because of movement pressure. 
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Former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz highlights this problem in his critique of the 
IMF: “Economic policy is today perhaps the most important part of America's interaction with the 
rest of the world. And yet the culture of international economic policy in the world's most 
powerful democracy is not democratic” (Stiglitz 2000). 
 Beyond infringements of democratic rights, states also retain the ability to inhibit 
mobilization by, for instance denying visas to activists (as the U.S. did for some Seattle 
protesters) and by scheduling global meetings in remote locations where democratic rights are not 
recognized.  Singapore was the site of the 1996 WTO ministerial, and future meeting sites are 
likely to be considerably less open and accessible than Seattle.  For instance, the Middle Eastern 
kingdom of Qatar is being considered as a possible site for the next WTO ministerial meeting.  
These and other possibilities for states to work together to raise the costs of protest through 
repression, counter-mobilization, and outright exclusion of activist groups must be considered as 
we continue to explore the impacts of globalization for democracy and contentious politics. 
 The Battle of Seattle has triggered a much broader public appreciation for the need to 
expand public discourse about global policies and to encourage greater transparency and 
accountability within these institutions.  Activists outside the United States have been inspired by 
seeing protesters in what one of my informants called a “politically underdeveloped nation” stand 
up – even in the face of brutal repression -- to resist the neoliberal expansion that their own 
government has been championing for decades.  The Battle of Seattle is one of the most 
significant recent episodes of collective action, and it points to a future of social movements that 
is increasingly global in both target and in form and that is in more direct confrontation with 
global institutions than its historical predecessors. 
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Table 1: Mobilizing Structures Behind the  
"Battle of Seattle" and N30* 
 
 
Type of 
Transnational 
Tie 
 
Movement1 
 
Extra-Movement 
 
No formal TN 
ties 
 
Local Chapters of National SMOs 
    (e.g., NOW) 
Neighborhood no-WTO Committees 
United for a Fair Economy 
 
School groups 
Friendship networks 
 
 
Diffuse TN ties 
 
Direct Action Network 
Reclaim the Streets 
Ruckus Society 
Coalition for Campus Organizing 
 
Union Locals 
Some churches 
 
Routine TN ties 
 
Public Citizen 
Global Exchange 
Rainforest Action Network 
United Students Against Sweatshops 
Council of Canadians 
Sierra Club 
 
AFL-CIO 
United Steel Workers of America 
International Longshore and Warehouse 
Union 
Some Churches 
 
Formal 
Transnational 
Organization 
 
Greenpeace 
Friends of the Earth 
International Forum on Globalization 
Third World Network 
Peoples Global Action 
50 Years is Enough Network 
Women's Environment & 
     Development Org. 
 
International Confederation of 
    Free Trade Unions 
European Farmers Union 
*This list is illustrative, not comprehensive.  The organizing scheme draws from McCarthy’s (1996) distinction 
between social movement structures, which are explicitly designed to promote social change goals, and 
“non-movement” (here “extra-movement) mobilizing structures.  The latter group are important components of 
social movement, but their basic organizational mandates encompass goals beyond those of social movements.  
1Organizations vary a great deal in their levels of formalization and hierarchy.  For instance, Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace have well defined organizational structures and institutional presences while groups like Peoples Global 
Action resist forming an organizational headquarters, and Reclaim the Streets seeks to sustain a loose, network-like 
structure relying heavily on electronic communications.       
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Table 2: Globalization & Protest Repertoires:  
Selected Anti-World Trade Organization Protest Forms  
Adaptations of Existing Forms Innovations in Traditional Protest Forms1 
Education & Mobilization  
*Cultivating organizations and “affinity groups” 
* Public demonstrations at global site 
* Teach-ins and speaker forums 
* Coordinated “N30" protests around the globe 
* Polity-bridging-- Local MAI-Free Zones 
*Nonviolence training/ Medic training 
 
Framing & Symbolic Mobilization 
*Press Center/ Press Conferences for mainstream media 
*Global witnessing / Transcontinental Caravan 
*Satirical newspaper wraps 
* Dramaturgy 
       -Street theater & puppets 
       -Greenpeace’s condom drop 
       -Banner hangs 
*Symbolic protests: 
     Boston WTeaO Party 
     Bové’s Roquefort resistance 
 
Disruption 
* Blockade of international conference site 
*Civil disobedience 
*Legal observers 
*Vandalism against corporate sites 
 
 
Organization/ Mobilization Actions 
* Transnational organization 
* Producing NGO Newspaper at global 
   conferences 
 
 
Borrowing Official Templates 
*Global Peoples’ Assembly 
*Participation in government delegations to  
   multilateral forum 
* People’s Tribunal versus corporate crimes 
 
 
Electronic Activism 2 
*Information exchange: Internet, list serve 
*Independent Media Center 
*Rapid response action networks 
*Virtual sit-in 
*Mirror Web sites 
*E-mail and fax jams 
 1
These activities are "innovative" in that they have been introduced to social movement repertoires more recently, although some have been used to 
some degree for many decades.  Most of these forms had been used frequently prior to the protests in Seattle by actors targeting global institutions. 
 2 For details on these activities, see "Electronic Civil Disobedience" Car Busters Winter 2000, vol. 1 No. 7, p. 22-3 (www.antenna.nl/ayfa/cb), "Fax Off, 
Bastards" Car Busters Winter 2000, vol. 1 No. 7, p. 23.  Seattle Times 11/30/99 P.A1. 
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